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DEFERRED PAYMENTS AS TAXABLE INCOME
PnRLIE P. FALLONt
Income defines something realized. The benefit is one which is
realized in the sense that it has been reduced to possession. The act
of taxation is the taking of a fixed part of an increment which has,
in some form, been reduced to possession. The income must be
possessed and by a possession which involves realization. The taxa-
tion statute does not reach unrealized gains and does not compel
taxpayers to reduce uncertain future gains to immediate possession
in order that a tax may presently apply.
The principle of realization is well established in taxation theory
and has been declared as the law of the income tax statutes by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In applying the Federal income tax statutes to cases of sales where
the purchaser takes as part payment deferred obligations, there may
exist one of the following facts with respect to the deferred obliga-
tions:
x. They may be of a present and easily realizable value in
established markets.
2. They may be contingent upon an event or upon income
or profits from the assets sold, as in the Logan case recently
decided by the Supreme Court.'
3. They may be of a speculative value.
4. They may be of some realizable present value but at a
great discount and not saleable in the established markets.
When these variations of fact are approached with the yardstick
of realization any difficulty with respect to them disappears.
The Treasury Department, the various divisions of the Internal
Revenue Bureau and the Board of Tax Appeals have approached
these problems with the principle of realization in mind but have
failed to make a definite and clear statement of it. The result has
been a line of holdings, opinions and decisions apparently inconsistent
with each other and placed upon distinctions of fact sometimes relat-
ing to realization but often violating that fundamental because they
treat as presently taxable, obligations which must be discounted
fifty per centum to obtain any present value and this valuation has
often been established upon opinion evidence.
When a sale of property is made at a profit and payment is made
tMember of the New York Bar.1Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Logan, 283 U. S. 4o4, 51 Sup. Ct. 55o
(1930).
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in cash, the profit is immediately reduced to possession and becomes
taxable.
Where a future payment is definitely contingent there is no basis
for present taxation under the decision in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Logan.2
- If the seller is regularly engaged in selling goods upon an install-
ment basis there is no difficulty because the statutes definitely defer
taxation.
It is in those cases where the sale is a casual one and the securities
taken by the purchaser are of a speculative value that the real diffi-
culty under our present statutes is presented.
Let us turn now to the statutes, regulations and decisions:
The Federal Income Tax Laws expressly defer taxation in all cases
where sales are regularly made on an installment basis;3 and in casual
sales of personal and real property where the price exceeds one thou-
sand dollars and the initial payments do not exceed forty per centum
of the selling price.
4
The regulations, which are the rules adopted by the Treasury
Department under the statutes, have created a further class of de-
ferred taxes, namely, those arising from sales of real property where
the initial payment exceeds the forty per centum named in the statute
and the obligations received by the vendor have no market value.
U. S. Treasury Regulations 77, Articles 352 and 354 provide:
"Sale of real property involving deferred payments.-Under
section 44 deferred-payment sales of real property fall into two
classeswhen considered with respect to the terms of sale, as follows:
(i) Sales of property on the installment plan, that is, sales in
which the payments received in cash or property other than
evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable
year in which the sale is made do not exceed 40 per cent of the
selling price.
(2) Deferred-payment sales not on the installment plan, that
is, sales in which the payments received in cash or property
other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during
the taxable year in which the sale is made exceed 40 per cent
of the selling price."
"Deferred-payment sale of real property not on installment
plan.--In transactions included in class (2) in article 352, the
2Supra, note I.
347 Stat. § 44(a) 185, 186 (1932), 26 U.S.C.A. § 953(d) (Act of 1932).
447 Stat. § 44(b) 186 (1932), 26 U.S.C.A. § 953(d) (Act of 1932). § 212(d)
(Act of 1926), 44 Stat. 23, made one-fourth of the purchase price the test. § 12o8
(Act of 1926),44 Stat. 130, madethe provisions of § 212(d) of that Act retroactive
for the taxes due under the Acts of 1916, 1917, I918, 1921 and 1924. See also
Article 46 of U. S. Treas. Reg. 69.
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obligations of the purchaser received by the vendor are to be
considered as the equivalent of cash to the amount of their fair
market value in ascertaining the profit or loss from the trans-
action."
"If the obligations received by the vendor have no fair market
value, the payments in cash or other property having a fair
market value shall be applied against and reduce the basis
of the property sold, and, if in excess of such basis, shall be tax-
able to the extent of the excess. Gain or loss is realized when
the obligations are disposed of or satisfied, the amount being
the difference between the reduced basis as provided above and
the amount realized therefor. Only in rare and extraordinary
cases does property have no fair market value."5
Thus the obligations in casual sales of real property are to be taxed
at their fair market value and if there is no fair market value, the tax
is deferred. But what is fair market value? If the obligations can
by some extreme effort be disposed of at fifty per centum of their face
value or contract value, is that value a fair market value or any value
which gives a right of present taxation? The decisions are extremely
contradictory. We find one indication of guiding principle here in
the legal concept which the regulations use as a basis of approach to
the problem.
The sections of the Revenue Act which these regulations govern-
ing the casual sales of real property seek to interpret, do not by any
literal reading justify them. They are, in fact, motivated by the
much broader principle of taxable and non-taxable income under the
revenue act as a whole. Income is indicative of something received,
something reduced to possession, and that is the only legal basis for
taxation of such deferred payments and the fundamental ground upon
which the intention of the regulations rests.
This is seen again when we turn to the method of taxation of de-
ferred payments in casual sales of personal property where the initial
payment exceeds the statutory limitation of forty per centum. This
is not a subject covered by the regulations. It has been the subject
of interpretation by the general counsel.
5Similar provisions are found in U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Arts. 352, 354, also U. S.
Treas. Reg. 69, Arts. 44, 46 and still earlier regulations as hereinafter mentioned.
Also see Office Decisions 842 (hereinafter cited as O.D.), 4 Cum. Bull. 89; and
Appeals and Review Memoranda 2698 (hereinafter cited as A.R.R.), Cum. Bull.
11-2, p. 76; also O.D. i81, Cure. Bull. i, p. 76.
The Supreme Court has recently interpreted U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 44 in an
opinion which brings out several points of legislative and procedural history in
David Burnet, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner v. S. and L. Build-
ing Corporation, decided by the Supreme Court on March 13th, 1933 (Internal
Rev. Bulletin XII, No. i5, p. 5).
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In General Counsel's Memorandum r387 there is found the follow-
ing:.
"The legal problem resolves itself into this. In the.case of a
taxpayer on a cash receipts and disbursements basis, what is
the method of computing the profit to be reported in the case
of a casual sale of personal property when the initial payment
exceeds one-fourth of the purchase price and the deferred
payments are not represented by any notes or other evidences
of indebtedness of the purchaser, the obligation of the purchaser
to make such payments being based solely on the promise to pay
contained in the contract?
Such a sale is similar to a deferred payment sale of real property
not on the installment plan. Article 44 of Regulations 69, which is
applicable under the Revenue Act of 3924 as well as under
the Revenue Act of 1926, defines a deferred payment sale of
real property not on the installment plan as a sale in which
the payments received in cash or property other than evidences
of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable year in which
the sale is made exceed one-fourth of the purchase price. The
rule for computing the profit derived from such a sale is also
applicable in the case of a deferred payment sale of personal
property not on the installment plan. Article 46 of Regulations 69
provides that in deferred payment sales of real estate not on
the installment plan the obligations of the purchaser received
by the vendor are to be considered as the equivalent of cash
to the amount of their fair market value in ascertaining the
profit or loss from the transaction, but, if the obligations re-
ceived by the vendor have no fair market value, the payment
in cash or other property having a fair market value shall
be applied against and reduce the basis of the property sold, and
if in excess of such basis, shall be taxable to the extent of such
excess. The term "Evidence of indebtedness of the purchaser"
and "Obligations of the purchaser received by the vendor" as
used in Articles 44 and 46 respectively, clearly refer to something
received by the vendor to represent the promise or promises
to pay contained in the contract of sale. If, therefore, the
deferred payments are not represented by notes or other like
obligations of the purchaser, the cash received by a taxpayer
on the cash receipts and disbursements basis should be ap-
plied against and reduce the basis of the property sold and, if
it is in excess of such basis, the excess should be reported as profit.
When the deferred payments are received they should be ap-
plied against the reduced basis, if the initial payment was not
in excess of the basis, and the excess over the reduced basis
or the total amount received, as the case may be, should be in-
cluded in income for the year of receipt." 7
GCum. Bull. VI-i, p. 48.
7General Counsel Gregg was not the first to deal with this problem. See O.D.
715, 3 Cur. Bull. io7-Art. 42 of U. S. Treas. Reg. 45; U. S. v. Christin. Oil
and Gas Co., 269 Fed. 458 (D. C, La. 1920). Dicta in Bedell v. Commissioner,
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This decision mentions the point of fact that no obligations or notes
were received by the seller but the decision and the regulations with
respect to casual sales of real property rest on the fundamental point
that income to be taxable must be received. If the securities taken
in part payment have a market value there exists a constructive
reduction to possession of the income.8
This is consistent with and does not exceed the limitation set forth
in Eisner v. Macomberg in which the Supreme Court, after defining
income, wrote:
3o F. (2nd) 622 (C. C. A. 2nd 1929); Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Miles, 273
Fed. 822 (D. C., Md. 1921), aff'd 259 U. S. 247,42 Sup. Ct. 483 (1921) (1916 Act).
See also General Counsel Gregg's opinion in G. C. M. 952; Cum. Bull. VI-I, p. I9I,
which is in part as follows:
"Neither the retroactive provisions of the Revenue Act of 1926, nor the
regulations adopted thereunder provide expressly for the manner of determin-
ing income resulting from a casual sale of, or contract to sell personal property
when the initial payment exceeds one-fourth of the purchase price and when
deferred payments are not represented by obligations having a fair market
value. This office is of the opinion that there should be applied to such a transac-
tion by analogy the principle promulgated as part of Article 46 of Regulations 69
with reference to real property.
Income resulting from the transaction here involved should be measured
by the payments actually received by the taxpayer to the extent that such
payment exceed the cost to the taxpayer of the property to be sold, and such
income is returnable for the year in which such excess is received. (U. S. Treas.
Reg. 69, Art. 46; 0. D. 889, C. B. 4, 89)."
These decisions of Mr. Gregg are cited and defined, perhaps limited, in G. C. M.
3350; C. B. VII-i, p. 62, where the test of "fair market value, readily ascertain-
able" is taken as a basis of taxation.
The General Counsel's Memorandum 1387 refers to the taxpayer therein report-
ing on a cash basis. This distinction is met with in many of the cases. It furnishes
no ground for a fundamental solution of the problem. Books must be kept on a
cash or accrual basis. But we cannot have an interpretation of a revenue law
that creates different rights and obligations according to a basis of bookkeeping:
(The Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, Collector, 282 U.S. 92, 51 Sup. Ct. II
(1930), contains an exposition of the law on the distinction between the cash and
accrual basis of accounting.) Further, the principle of present taxation often
accelerates, for purpose of taxation, the actual dates of accrual. In Charles C.
Ruprecht v. Commissioner, I6 Board of Tax Appeals Report 919 (1929) (herein-
after cited as B. T.A.) the Board referred to "a mere account receivable" as not
being a safe basis of present taxation. (Aff'd 39 F. (2nd) 458 (C. C. A. 5th 193o).
For a further discussion of the sources of accrual and its listory in the taxation
statute, see David Burnet, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner v. S. and
L. Building Corp., supra note 6. For an application of the accounting principle
see G. C. M. xI655, I. R. B. XII, No. 15, p. 3.
8 Reynolds, Collector v. Donald McMurray, 6o F. (2nd) 843 (C. C. A. ioth
1932); see also U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (1918 ed.) Art. 126, 18o; Regulations 45,
Art. 23, 1533 construed in The Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
United States, decided by the Supreme Court, February 6th,i933, 53 Sup. Ct. 337.
9252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (I919); Lucas v. American Code Co., 280U. S.
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"Here we have the essential matter; not a gain accruing to
capital, not a growth or increment of value in the investment,
but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding
from the property, severed from the capital however invested
or employed, and coming in, being 'derived', that is, received
or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use,
benefit, and disposal; that is income derived from property.
Nothing else answers the description."
On the broad ground of Eisner v. Macomber, income is not taxable
unless and until it is received. The rules with respect to both real
and personal property are governed by this common denominator
and any difference with respect to real and personal property in
either regulation or interpretation becomes illogical and not war-
ranted in law.
The Commissioner has not by the Regulations accepted the inter-
pretation of the General Counsel's office in the memorandum cited
with respect to personal, property nor followed it in practice.10 The
decisions of District Courts and Courts of Appeal are not necessarily
followed by the Commissioner, except in so far as they bind him by
their judgments with respect to a specific case. A decision of the
Supreme Court is alone decisive on the law.
The last paragraph of Art. 354 of Regulations 74 provides that if the
obligations received by the vendor have no fair market value, then
gain or loss with respect to these 6bligations is realized when the
obligations are disposed of or satisfied. This creates a question of
fact as to the existence of a fair market value. This question of fact
in turn involves a question of law as to the meaning of the term "fair
market value."
The Commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals avoid the issue as
to the status of deferred payments by treating the matter as a ques-
tion of fact. The issue of law as to the meaning of "fair market value"
has been disposed of by reductions of face values and contract values
by as much as fifty per centum." The total result is that "fair market
445, 449, 50 Sup. Ct. 202 (1929). "Generally speaking, the income law is con-
cerned only with realized losses, as with realized gains."
See also Bourn v. McLoughlin, ig F. (2nd) 148 (D. C., Calif. 1927); O'Meara v.
Commissioner, 34 F. (2nd) 39o (C. C. A. loth 1929); and Merchants Loan and
Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct. 386 (1920).
10ver the past year the Commissioner's acquiescences indicate a tendency
to follow Woodmar Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 958 (1929). Acq.
IX-i C. B. 59 which supports in principle the point of realization. This inclina-
tion is also indicated by the failure to prosecute to a conclusion the appeal in
Andrew B. C. Dohrmann, r9 B. T. A. 89o (1930), 56 F. (2nd) xo8r (C. C. A. 9th
1932).
"Ernest P. Flint, 12 B. T. A. 20 (1928); 0. L. Moon, 6 B. T. A. 385 (1927),
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value" may be anything, the question of law as to whether a "fair
market" must exist before the obligations are presently taxable is
written out entirely and the sole point is: What are the obligations
worth? The burden of proof as to the actual worth or lack of worth
is upon the taxpayer and it is generally presented in the form of
opinion evidence.
12
The Federal Courts have held that the words "market value" in
taxation statutes impliedly require that there must be a market for
the obligations or securities involved.
In Walter v. Duffy3 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit wrote:
"We start, then, with the fact that we are here dealing with
the existence of a market and a market price evidenced by
sales in such market, so that our first and basic inquiry is
whether there actually was a market for the sale of this insurance
stock. Now, market implies the existence of supply and demand,
for without the existence of either factor no market is shown.
Standing alone, offers to sell with no takers, or offers to buy,
with no sellers, show no such concurring willing action of buyer
and seller as is involved where a market is made by buyers and
sellers who by their respective sales and purchases make amarket
price which the law takes as evidence of value. Now in the case
before us we have a situation where we think the existence of
a fair determinative evidential market for this particular stock
did not exist. That the stock of the company was not traded in
generally is clear."
The Federal Courts have almost consistently maintained this
position.14 The Board of Tax Appeals after several reversals by the
Federal Courts has adopted the same position with respect to issues
of capital stock in exchange for asseis.1
and Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Company, 14 B. T. A. 797 (x928) are
examples of numerous similar cases.12Andrew B. C. Dohrmann, i9 B. T. A. 507 (1930); O'Meara v. Commissioner,
supra note 9.
13287 Fed. 41, 45 (C. C. A. 3rd 1923). Followed by the Board of Tax Appeals
in Wallis Tractor Co., 3 B. T. A. 98I (1926) and Commissioner acquiesced in
C. B. VI-i, Page 6.
14Phillips v. United States, 12 F. (2nd) 598 (D. C. ,Pa. 1926); Heiner v..Crosby,
24 F. (2nd) z9z (C. C. A. 3rd 1928); O'Meara v. Commissioner, supra note 9
(all of these cases involve transfers of capital stock). But see Eldredge v. United
States, 31 F. (2nd) 924 (C. C. A. 6th 1929) overruled on rehearing of Hitchcock v.
Commissioner, 49 F. (2nd) 1078 (C. C. A. 6th 1931) in view of Burnett v. Logan
supra note i. Tsivoglou v. U. S., 27 F. (2nd) 564 (D. C. Mass. 1928), aff'd 3i F.
(2nd) 7o6 (C. C. A. 1st 1929). Contra and in which the necessity of a market is
denied as dictum, see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Swenson, 56 F.
(2nd) 544 (C. C. A. 5th 1932).
"5Andrew B. C. Dohrmann, i9 B. T. A. 507 (i93o). This case went on appeal
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The position with respect to fair market value first taken by the
Commissioner was identical with that now maintained by the Federal
Courts:
"In the absence of reason to the contrary the words 'fair
market value' must be given their ordinary meaning. * * *
It is not however what can be obtained for the property when the
owner is under peculiar compulsion to sell or the purchaser to buy
nor is it a purely speculative value which an owner could not
reasonably expect to obtain for the property although he might
possibly be fortunate enough to do so. * * * It implies the
existence of a public of possible buyers at a fair price."
1 6
The Board of Tax Appeals' decisions with respect to deferred
payments have not followed any consistent and definite ground as to
the necessity of a market or a "fair market value." It has held "fair
market value" is a question of fact;17 that the value of obligations not
readily convertible into cash were not taxable until sold;'$ that obliga-
tions must have a readily realizable market value; 9 that possible sale
at a great discount did not create a market value;2 that where the
security was only the contract and not an independent obligation the
tax is deferred;21 that evidence that obligations might not be sold at
the equivalent of their face value rebutted the existence of market
value ;'S that securities had no fair market value when they were not
saleable to banks; in Woodmar Realty Co. v. Commissioner,24 the
position is identical with that of the Federal Courts; on the other
hand there are many cases where discounts as high as fifty per cen-
turn have either been approved or fixed by the Board on opinion
evidence as fair market value.2
by the Commissioner to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals where it was
evidently disposed of by a compromise between the parties. See Commissioner
v. Dohrmann, 56 F. (2nd) io81 (C. C. A. 9th 1932).
16A. R. R. 57; C. B. 1, p. 40.
'7Andrew B. C. Dorhmann, i9 B. T. A. 507 (1930).
18Saeger v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 890 (1927); Joliet Norfolk Farm Cor-
poration, 8 B. T. A. 824 (1927), acq. VII-i C. B. 16; Miami Beach Improvement
Co., I4 B. T. A. 10 (1928) acq. VIII-i C. B. 31.
"Stevenson v. Commissioner, 9 B. T. A. 552 (1927), acq. VII-I C. B. 30.
2°Anton M. Meyer, 3 B. T. A. 1329 (1926).
"Charles C. Ruprecht v. Commissioner, I6 B. T. A. 919 (1929).
2J. H. Johnson et al., 19 B. T. A. 840 (1930), aff'd 56 F. (2nd) 58 (C. C. A. 5th
1932); Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 487 (1928).
"Seffie Foster, i9 B. T. A. 958 (1930).
2417 B. T. A. 88 (1929), acq. IX-i C. B. 59.
"See cases supra note 9. Collateral determinative of value, Geo. Antonoplosi 3 B.
T. A. 1236 (1926); attitude of banks as to discount rejected as evidence of market
value, Wray-Dickinson Co., 6 B. T. A. 269 (1927); occasional sales at discount
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Taken together the many decisions of the Board cannot be reduced
to any controlling rule and cannot be reconciled on the ground that
the Act of 1926 used the term "market value" whereas the prior
revenue acts used the term "readily realizable market value."
2
The decision in Woodmar Realty Co. v. Commissioner and its accept-
ance by the Commissioner establishes firm ground upon which a unity
of law may be established.
The diffeulty has arisen through the partial recognition of the
principles defined in Eisner v. Macomber" and a failure to make a
definite application of them. The attempt to reduce future obliga-
of 4oto 5o per centum used to fixvalue, Calvin Crouse, ii B. T.A. 1327 (1928);
value fixed at 25 per centum of face value, Ernest P. Flint, 12 B. T. A. 20 (2928);
bonds valued at 60 per centum of face value, August Belmont Hotel Co., I8
B. T. A. 632 (1930); cases involving contingent payment, Mainard E. Crosby,
14 B. T. A. 98o (1929) and William Parris, 2o B. T. A. 320 (193o); valuation of
contracts of sale; D. M. Stevenson, 9 B. T. A. 552 (1927); C. L. Starr, 9 B. T. A.
886 (1927) Gertrude H. Sweet, 8 B. T. A. 404 (1927); Woodmar Realty Co.,
17 B. T. A. 88 (1929); Calvin T. Graves, 17 B. T. A. 1318 (1929); Rapid Transit
Land Sales Co., 2o B. T. A. 6o8 (193o); Ravlin Corp., 19 B. T. A. 1112 (1930),
acq. IX-2 C. B. 5o.
"The Board of Tax Appeals, in Woodmar Realty Co., 17 B. T. A. 88 (1929),
passed upon transactions in the years 1923, 1924 and 1926 and held:
"The sole question involved is whether the Commissioner properly
computed taxable income by including in gross income, at face value, amounts
to be paid inthe future under contracts of sale made by the petitioner. The
evidence leaves no doubt these contracts had no fair market value or readily
realizable market value when received."
It is quite clear the Board does not make the difference in the wording of the
1921 and other revenue acts the basis of its decisions in these matters. This is
shown by the case of Anton M. Meyer, 3 B.T.A. 1329 (1926) in which the Com-
missioner acquiesced C. B. VI-I, page 4. This case was decided under the 1921
act and is cited by the Board as an authority under the x918 ("market value")
and 1921 ("readily realizable market value") acts as well.
The following is a list of cases in which the Meyer case is cited as a precedent:
Transaction i919 and 292o-Lawrence D. Miller, 7 B. T. A. 58i (1927), Meyer
case cited at p. 583.
Transaction 292o-Joliet Norfolk Farm Corporation, 8 B. T. A. 824 (1927),
Meyer case cited at p. 825.
Transaction 192o--D. M. Stevenson, 9 B. T. A. 552, (1927), Meyer case cited
at p. 556.
Transaction 2922-Hugh MacRae, 9 B. T. A. 428 (1927).
Transaction 1923-C. L. Star, 9 B. T. A. 886 (2927).
Transaction 9g--Old Farmers Oil Co., 12 B. T. A. 203 (1928), Meyer case
cited at p. 228.
See also comment of U. S. C. C. A. upon these terms in Bedell v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 7.
1 Supra note 9. The Supreme Court has determined the nature of closed
transactions in North Texas Lumber Co. v. Lucas, 281 U.S. ii, 50 Sup. Ct. 184
(2929) and Logan v. Commissioner, supra note I.
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tions to the status of closed transactions -where there is io market
to determine value is inconsistent with the holding in Eisner v.
Macomber, is unnecessary since the actual income may be reached for
taxation later and is speculative in determining value.28 The entire
record deals with a field in which the governing law is being evolved.
The progress is not different from that under which the common law
and equity were developed into a recognized governing code and
under adverse conditions flowing from a far more complicated field of
activity.
28Short term notes secured by mortgage bonds were treated as realized gain
by the Supreme Court in Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co."v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, decided by the Supreme Court, January 9th, 1933, 53 Sup. Ct.
257, but the issue was not raised and the case turned upon the interpretation
of the Sections of 2o2-(a) and 203-(a) of the Act of 1926 wic. cover gains arising
from the exchange of securities in reorganizations of corporations.
